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DISCOURSE PRESENTATION AND SPEECH  
(AND WRITING, BUT NOT THOUGHT) 
SUMMARY1 
Mick Short 
 Lancaster University, U.K. 
 
Résumé : Cet article examine les modalités d’un phénomène relativement peu étudié dans le 
domaine du discours rapporté, à savoir le sommaire de propos rapportés (oraux et écrits, mais pas 
intérieurs), et il mesure son impact sur la théorie du discours rapporté. Par une attention 
minutieuse portée au sommaire de propos oraux et écrits, ainsi que d’autres cas où les propos 
sont de toute évidence présentés mais pas rapportés, on peut retravailler la notion canonique des 
degrés de fidélité dans le discours rapporté, ce qui est nécessaire, me semble-t-il, pour expliquer 
les effets prototypiques des différentes catégories sur l’échelle de présentation des propos 
rapportés dans des contextes (en l’occurrence fictionnels) où les propos sont indiscutablement 
présentés mais pas rapportés. Je distingue entre ce que j’appelle « sommaire de propositions » 
(dans lequel sont résumées des propositions individuelles) et « sommaire de discours » (le 
résumé de portions plus longues de discours) ; j’avance que, alors que le sommaire de 
propositions est généralement associé à ce que l’on a coutume d’appeler la « représentation d’un 
acte de parole » par le narrateur – qu’il s’agisse de propos écrits ou oraux –, le sommaire de 
discours peut en principe utiliser n’importe laquelle des catégories de l’échelle du discours 
rapporté. Par conséquent, je voudrais proposer une échelle des modalités du discours représenté 
pour compléter l’échelle des modalités du discours rapporté existante. Je formule également 
l’hypothèse que la notion de sommaire s’applique mal à la représentation de pensées, et je 
m’interroge sur les conséquences de ce phénomène. Cette réflexion me permet (1) de présenter 
un changement mineur, mais que j’espère utile, dans la désignation des catégories de 
présentation du discours, (2) de commenter quelques cas qui sont intéressants par leur ambiguïté, 
(3) de considérer les indices qui nous montrent que des propos sont résumés et (4) de corriger 
quelques erreurs de Short (1988) et du chapitre 10 de Leech et Short (2007 [1981]). 
 
Mots-clés: sommaire de discours, présentation de discours, ambiguïté dans la présentation de 
discours, discours rapporté, discours représenté, fidélité, sommaire de propositions, sommaire 
citationnel, sommaire de paroles, sommaire de propos écrits. 
                                                     
1
  This article was previously published in Language and Literature, Feb. 2012 vol. 21 n°1 (18-32). 
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1. Introduction 
Sternberg (1982a, 1982b), Short (1988), Tannen (1989: 110-19) and 
Fludernik (1993: 409-14) have pointed out that Direct Speech (DS) can be used 
to present propositions which cannot possibly be accurate reports, either 
because, for example, too much time has elapsed for memory of an original to 
be accurate (this often happens in spoken ‘reports’ of speech, as Tannen points 
out) or because what is being reported as speech never actually occurred, e.g. in 
hypotheticals like ‘Get lost’ in ‘I would have said “Get lost” but I was too 
embarrassed by what he said’ (see Short, Semino and Wynne 2002) or what 
Fludernik (1993: 11) calls ‘condensed speech acts, in which a brief discourse 
schematically represents an entire speech event’, a notion which is not unlike, 
but not identical with, the concept of speech summary which I suggested in 
Short (1988) and will develop here.  
Fludernik, following Sternberg, argues via what is termed the ‘direct discourse 
fallacy’ that the assumption of faithfulness in discourse report has to be abandoned. 
I have, with others, already argued against this view in Short, Semino and 
Wynne (2002). There, we argued (a) that it is only when reporting is involved 
that issues of faithfulness (which effectively means lexical and grammatical 
faithfulness),2 and so also the stronger notion of verbatim report (see Clark and 
Gerrig, 1990), apply and (b) that careful consideration of the context and co-text 
is needed to be sure that reporting is actually taking place, rather than being 
merely presentation (as in fictional or hypothetical speech) or representation 
(for example to bring out a contrasting ideological ‘take’ on the original speech). 
Hence we suggested that for clarity, and to avoid confusion, we need: 
(a) to distinguish terminologically among (i) discourse presentation (which refers only to 
the presenting discourse, the posterior discourse in situations of report and representation), 
(ii) discourse report (which assumes, for direct discourse presentation, a match between 
the lexis, deixis and grammar in the anterior and posterior discourses) and (iii) discourse 
representation (which assumes a mismatch between the lexis, deixis and grammar of 
the anterior and posterior discourses)3 and 
 
(b) to distinguish systematically among (i) speech, (ii) writing and (iii) thought presentation, 
only using the term ‘discourse presentation’ and its category-specific equivalents (e.g. 
‘free indirect discourse’) when talking very generally or when there is ambiguity or 
uncertainty as to whether one or another form of discourse is being presented. 
                                                     
2 
 When reporting is cross-language, even these requirements have to relaxed, of course, although one would 
expect as close lexical and grammatical correspondence as possible between the source and target language. 
3
  For discussions of discourse in fiction, I prefer, as indicated in Semino and Short (2004) to use the term 
‘presentation’. Much grammatical discussion of direct and indirect speech etc uses ‘report’ because the 
relation between the anterior and posterior speech situations is assumed to be unproblematic (indeed, 
grammarians have traditionally invented their own examples) and discussions in Critical Discourse 
Analysis usually focus on situations where (usually illicit) manipulation of the original has taken place, 
and so such analysts usually use the term ‘representation’. 
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It is important for us to be very clear about exactly what we are talking 
about if we are to characterize accurately the meanings and effects of the various 
forms of discourse presentation. Moreover, thought presentation, unlike speech 
and writing presentation is not the presentation of a form of ostensible inter-
personal communication; and a proper understanding of the presentation of 
communication also needs to take account of the fact that the assumptions we 
have about (i) speech and (ii) writing, although similar in many ways, can also 
be different from one another. Indeed, I suspect that it is because of descriptive 
imprecision from traditional times to the present over speech/ writing that 
much of the recent confusion concerning the concept of faithfulness has arisen.  
‘Speech’ has always been the default term in discourse presentation, as 
the oratio directa vs oratio obliqua distinction in Latin rhetoric, in spite of the 
fact that the recording of spoken language has only been possible over the last 
hundred years or so, shows. Essentially, most discourse presentation which has 
been described has, for thousands of years, been found in written (and often 
fictional) texts. Not surprisingly, then, our canonical assumptions concerning 
faithfulness actually relate to writing (e.g. written scholarly debates), not 
speech and it is in writing that the assumptions concerning lexical and 
grammatical faithfulness to an original in DS presentations are strongest (see 
Short, Semino and Wynne 2002). As students and scholars, we can be accused 
of unreasonable manipulation if we misquote from other written texts and on 
most occasions writers, even tabloid journalists, try not to commit the sin of 
misquotation (which counts in Gricean terms as a violation of the maxim of 
quality).4 And as teachers, we punish our students severely if they violate this 
maxim in the other direction too. Plagiarism, the pretence that the words of 
others, and the propositions they present, are those of the current writer is as 
unpardonable a sin as that of misrepresenting what others have said.  
All this suggests that the concept of faithfulness needs to be preserved  
in the real world, otherwise the attitudes I have just referred to cannot be 
adequately explained. And our responses to fictional discourse presentation are 
clearly based on the schemata we have developed from our experience of real-
world discourse presentation, in line with Ryan’s (1991) Minimum Distance 
Principle. Of course the notion of faithfulness in fiction is a chimera, as just 
about everything is invented by the author. In 1st- and 2nd-person fictional 
narration there was no actual anterior speech situation for the narrator to 
‘report’, even though we pretend to ourselves when reading that there was; and 
in 3rd-person narration it is arguable that the idea of anterior vs posterior 
discourse situations does not sensibly apply at all - it usually seems that what is 
                                                     
4
  Ikeo (2009) discusses interesting cases of DW in literary reviews, where what is quoted is accurate but 
the truncated ways in which the quotations are selected and contextualised create significant 
misrepresentations of the original texts. 
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said is being said for the first time ‘in front of our eyes’. Note also that being 
faithful to an original in real-world direct speech (DS) does not normally 
involve correspondences in intonation and pronunciation between the anterior 
and posterior situations, presumably because they are irrelevant in written 
presentations and would require talented oral mimicry in spoken presentations. 
This also shows the salience of writing presentation in the formation of 
our discourse presentation schemata. Direct speech in novels, for example, has 
the lively, dramatic qualities that it has, compared with the less dramatic 
indirect speech (IS) form, precisely because it is associated schematically with 
a claim to present accurately the lexis, deixis and grammar of the (putative) 
original, whereas IS does not. 
Speech and writing summaries, like the presentation of hypothetical speech, 
do not constitute presentational report and so cannot be used as counter examples to the 
faithfulness account. Moreover, I suspect that speech summary is much more extensive 
than we have noticed so far5 and that many of the examples of inaccurate DS/DW 
presentation used to date to argue against the notion of faithfulness in discourse 
report can be seen to be summary, and so not really counter examples at all.  
2. My current position on the discourse presentation scales  
In section 3 below I will discuss a series of examples of speech 
summary, but as a prelude to that discussion, I need to outline briefly, for those 
who are not familiar with it, my current view of the speech, writing and thought 
presentation scales. My current position, is slightly different from Semino and 
Short (2004) and the same as that presented in Short (2007), except that I now 
think it clearer to use the term ‘Presentation’ (and so the acronym ‘P’) rather 
than ‘Representation’ (and so the acronym ‘R’) for the various category labels, 
as this term focuses entirely on the presenting situation and so helps us to avoid 
the trap of confusing presentation with representation and report. In the past I, 
like others, have unfortunately run these notions together. For example, in 
chapter 10 of Short (1996), following on from chapter 10 of Leech and Short 
(1981), I use the terms ‘speech presentation’ and ‘thought presentation’ for 
chapter and section headings but then use ‘representation’ (which suggests a 
change from an anterior situation to the posterior, presenting situation) for the 
Narrator’s Representation of a Speech Act (NRSA) category and its thought 
presentation equivalent (NRTA).  
                                                     
5 
 This is testable empirically, something which would throw useful light on the ‘faithfulness debate’. What 
makes me suspect that summary may be quite common is that when Elena Semino, Martin Wynne and I 
were annotating the Lancaster SW&TP corpus described in Semino and Short (2004) and elsewhere, we 
quite often inserted a note in our annotations to the effect that summary was involved, even though we 
were not looking for the phenomenon at the time.  
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For clarity I will first introduce some speech presentation examples 
(using, as is traditional, roughly equivalent manipulations of an initial DS 
string) and associated category labels (including the term ‘presentation’ [P] for 
the reasons outlined above) and then I will outline the faithfulness scales as I 
currently see them. Note that our assumptions about the effects of the various 
presentational categories rest on rearranging a DS string to create the other 
categories and their resultant effects. This helps to explain why we tend to use 
such proposition-domain manipulations when introducing discourse presentation 
to students (I distinguish proposition-domain summary from discourse-domain 
summary in 3 below). 
Category    Example 
Direct Speech (DS):   “Just go – now!” he said grumpily. 
Free Indirect Speech (FIS):   She should get out now! 
Indirect Speech (IS):   Grumpily he told her to leave.  
Narrator’s Presentation Speech Act (NPSA): Grumpily he ordered her out. 
Narrator’s Presentation of Voice (NPV): He spoke grumpily. 
 
These five speech presentation categories, and their equivalents for writing 
presentation, are each associated canonically with differing sets of proposition-
domain faithfulness assumptions, as shown below (where the categories are 
presented in the reverse order from that above so that I can outline the 
faithfulness claims in ascending quantitative order from one claim, in NPV, to 
four claims, in DS): 
Category Faithfulness claims 
NPV/NPW:  Speech/writing took place (1) 
NPSA/NPWA:  (1) + speech/writing act specified, optionally with the topic indicated (2) 
IS/IW:   (1) + (2) + indication of propositional content (3) 
FIS/FIW:    (1) + (2) + (3) (+ 4???) 
DS/DW:  (1) + (2) + 3 + words and structure used to express the content (4) 
 
I suggest that the canonical faithfulness assumptions stemming from 
writing presentation effectively ‘wash over’ straightforwardly onto speech 
presentation. The faithfulness claims increase, one at a time, as we move down 
the list, one category at a time, from NPV/NPW to DS/DW, except for 
FIS/FIW (free-indirect discourse is famously a semantic halfway house between 
the direct and indirect forms). Indeed, the indeterminacy with respect to 
faithfulness claim 4 (in novelistic terms, raising the issue of whose words are 
being used, narrator or character) explains why the free indirect category is 
perceived by readers and hearers in the way that it is. The NPSA category (and 
NPWA) is often associated with summary, precisely because the most it can 
contain is a speech act value plus an indication of the topic of speech. For 
NPSA/NPWA, unlike DS/DW, FIS/FIW and IS/IW, there is no separate 
propositional form for the presented string. Discussions of faithfulness in 
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discourse report usually centre on the direct categories, as this is where the 
largest number of faithfulness claims are made, and rarely consider in any 
detail the two categories with the least faithfulness claims, precisely because 
propositional faithfulness is not at issue with these presentational forms. When 
we move from NPSA/NPWA to NPV/NPW in report, where all we are told is 
that speech or writing occurred, the faithfulness claim is so weak that the term 
‘faithfulness’ no longer relates to the form or content of the reported discourse 
at all and so the relationship to the fuller proposition-domain forms is non-
existent and even the term ‘proposition-domain summary’ is inapplicable. 
As I have said above, speech presentation and writing presentation, 
which both involve the presentation of ostensible communication, seem to act 
in rather similar ways, with the canonical assumptions being even stronger for 
writing presentation than for speech presentation. However, thought presentation 
is not the presentation of a communication between people but the presentation 
of someone’s inner world. So, in the set of discourse presentation scales in 
Figure 1 below, I separate the thought presentation scale from the other two scales, 
as in Semino and Short (2004). Square brackets are used to separate off elements 
which are linked to the discourse presentation scales but are not technically part 
of the scales themselves. [N] = sentences of the narration of states, events and 
actions; [NPS]/[NPW]/[NPT] (Narrator’s Presentation of Speech/Writing/Thought 
= reporting clauses and other, non-clausal, reporting signals): 
Speech and writing presentation  
[N] [NPS] NPV NPSA IS FIS DS6 
[N] [NPW] NPW NPWA  IW FIW DW7 
              Norm? 
Thought presentation 
[N+IN8] [NPT] NPT NPTA IT FIT DT FDT9
                   ← Norm?→ 
Figure 1. The discourse presentation scales 
 
                                                     
6 
 This DS category is wider than that traditionally used, and includes what is usually known as Free Direct 
Speech (FDS), which I now consider as a minor variant within the DS category, rather than a separate 
category on its own, as, when we move from DS to FDS there is no extra faithfulness claim, as there is 
when we move rightwards from other category to another on the speech presentation scale. See Short 
(1988) and Semino and Short (2004: 49). 
7 
 DW includes FDW for reasons parallel to those noted in note 3 above. 
8
  IN = Internal Narration, covers the narrator’s descriptions of internal cognitive states which are not 
thought presentation, e.g. ‘Anger well up inside him’. 
9
  Whether or not we need a DT/FDT distinction on the thought presentation scale needs careful empirical 
consideration, in my view. As the notion of faithfulness claims does not really make sense with respect 
to thought presentation it could be that there is a clear distinction in effect between DT and FDT. I 
suspect not, but it is an open question. 
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Because thought presentation is not the presentation of ostensible 
communication, the thought presentation scale is constructed on the basis of a 
less than perfect analogy with the other scales. Some category effects seem to 
be roughly equivalent, for example the dramatic effects of DT (and some FIT), 
compared with IT, seem similar to those on the speech and writing presentation 
scales. But others are not. I argued in chapter 10 of Leech and Short (2007 
[1981]) that the differences in effect between FIS (distance from the speaker, 
irony etc) and FIT (closeness to the speaker, sympathy etc) are a consequence 
of the fact that the norm for speech presentation (because it is ostensible 
communication) is DS whereas the norm for thought presentation must be more 
indirect; consequently the free indirect category represents a move in a 
different direction from the norm on the thought presentation scale, compared 
with those for speech and writing presentation scales. The bigger difference 
between thought presentation and the other forms of discourse presentation is 
also seen in the need for an extra category of Internal Narration (IN). And, 
perhaps most importantly for this paper, it is not at all clear that NPTA has a 
proposition-domain summarizing effect, as NPSA and NPWA usually do, 
because summary does not seem sensibly to apply to a form of discourse 
presentation which does not involve ostensible communication and so an 
‘original proposition’ is not available to the presenter to be summarized.  
3. Speech and writing summary  
Typically, when stylisticians discuss the NPSA (and NPWA) category 
they characterize its effect as summarizing in type, for the reasons I have 
suggested in 2 above. When we establish the various discourse presentation 
categories, we typically do so, as I did above, by manipulating a proposition in 
a DS string into the forms associated with the other presentation categories. In 
other words, the kind of summary that is involved in NPSA and NPWA is 
effectively proposition-domain summary. However, there is another form of 
summary, related to whole discourses or parts of them, which I want to call 
discourse-domain summary. When I was a grammar school pupil many years 
ago, I was trained to write summaries of texts, to varying lengths (100 words, 
500 words, and so on). This was, in effect, I assume, training for possible 
administrative roles in later life; when secretaries in institutions take the 
minutes in meetings, what they create, and then present in their ‘published’ 
minutes of meetings, are discourse-domain writing presentation summaries of 
anterior speech, sometimes of individual turns in the meeting and sometimes of 
sequences of turns, summarized together. 
Once we see that speech and writing can be summarized a proposition at 
a time or a larger stretch at a time, we can see that there might be ambiguities 
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between whether what is being presented in the NPSA/NPWA form is the 
summary of a proposition or of some larger piece of discourse. This has led me 
to realize that I made a mistake in section 10.1.3 of Leech and Short (1981) 
with two  invented examples, [12] and [13], which I used to illustrate what I 
was then calling the Narrative Report of Speech acts (NRSA; now Narrators’ 
Presentation of Speech Acts [NPSA]): 
He promised to return.  
He promised to visit her again.10 
In fact, both of these examples are formally IS, as the presented string is 
clearly a clause (albeit a short, non-finite one).11 I suspect that I was assuming 
without realizing it that the summary was of more than one proposition in each 
case, and so mistakenly assumed that, because they were summaries, they were 
examples of proposition-domain NRSA (now NPSA) summary, as NPSA is the 
obvious proposition-summary category on the speech presentation scale.  
Below, I discuss a series of examples of discourse-domain speech summary. 
I do not have a full catalogue of summary examples yet (in particular, I am still 
looking for writing presentation examples), but essentially I want to suggest as 
a consequence of the analyses below that: 
 
(a) in addition to the more ‘standard’, one-proposition-at-a-time, presentation (including 
proposition-domain summary for NPSA and NPWA), speech presentation and writing 
presentation can also be used to present summaries of longer stretches of speech and 
writing (discourse-domain summary), including whole discourses/texts; 
 
(b) as all of the categories on the presentation scales appear in principle to be usable for 
presenting discourse-domain summary, we effectively need two discourse-domain 
summary presentation scales (speech and writing)  in addition to the three proposition-
domain discourse presentation scales (speech, writing and thought), as set out in Short 
and Semino (2004), with the minor modifications I have suggested in section 2 above; 
 
(c) there is no equivalent discourse-domain thought presentation summary scale as the 
notion of thought summary does not make much sense –  summary can only reasonably 
occur when an original is available to be summarized, something which is arguably 
impossible even when we present our own thoughts, let alone those of others; 
 
(d) the establishment of the discourse-domain speech and writing summary presentation 
scales helps us more easily to identify and describe accurately a range of interesting 
presentation ambiguities. 
3.1. Indirect Speech (IS) discourse-domain summary  
As I have suggested that the above invented examples from Leech and 
Short (1981) can be seen as IS discourse-domain summary, I will begin with a 
                                                     
10 
 These invented examples were changed to be more accurate in the second edition of Style in Fiction. 
11
  I would like to thank Geoffrey Leech for pointing this out to me. 
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clear textual example of this category. Here, and from now on, where relevant I 
will bolden the stretch of text I am focusing on: 
At other times the daughter, heart-stoppingly voluptuous in her tight Californian pants, 
would lead me by the hand through the ruined garden, to the last clump of still-rooted 
myrtles, then crouch, bare-kneed, and pull me down beside her, and demand to know 
my ideological convictions.  
          (Laurie Lee 1969 As I Walked Out One Midsummer Morning, 35) 
This example from an autobiography (which is another example of IS 
involving a non-finite clause) looks more like the presentation of a summary of 
what was said rather than of a single proposition, mainly because of the clash 
between the single-proposition structure and abstract lexis on the one hand, 
and, on the other hand, the schematic assumptions we have for emotionally-
charged interactions. It is implausible that the young woman would have 
uttered just one, rather abstract, single-proposition sentence like ‘What are your 
ideological convictions?’ or ‘What are your political views?’. Even though the 
text is not fictional, in this case, because we do not have access to the original 
very private conversation referred to, a decision as to whether the presentation 
is of a discourse-domain summary or not can only be based on what is in the 
presenting text and the relevant schematic assumptions the reader brings to the 
text. In real life, it is sometimes possible in principle at least, to check a 
posterior discourse presentation against a recorded original, although in 
practice that often turns out not to be possible. The same is true of the 
following DS examples. 
3.2. Direct Speech (DS) discourse-domain summary  
When, in Short (1988) I discussed newspaper headlines like: 
UGH! GET RID OF MY SQUINT 
    (The Sun, 21 June 1984) 
 
You’ve given me a squint, said Maggie 
(Daily Express, 21 June 1984) 
 
I pointed out that it was unlikely that Margaret Thatcher, the UK Prime 
Minister at the time, ever said what she was presented as saying in these DS 
headlines, and that, indeed, there was no contextual evidence in the ensuing 
articles for her having used the words presented. The implausibility here relates 
mainly to character and role. Mrs Thatcher typically spoke rather formally in 
public in any case, but when she was Prime Minister she also had a duty to 
keep her language formal to reflect her position. Effectively, then, as with the 
Laurie Lee example,  our assessments of whether we have proposition-domain 
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presentation or discourse-domain summary presentation will be based on 
textual clues in the presenting text and schematic assumptions related to 
situation, speaker role and so on. 
I went on in Short (1988)  to consider whether the above examples might 
be speech summary, but concluded that the DS form weakened that interpretative 
possibility (even though I noted that IS could sometimes be used to present 
summaries of stretches discourse longer than one proposition) and came to the 
conclusion (followed up on, in more detail, in the proposals in Short, Semino 
and Wynne 2002) that faithfulness constraints varied depending on factors like 
genre (for example news reports in popular newspapers might be less faithful 
than those in serious papers) and textual position (for example that headlines 
might be allowed more faithfulness leeway than the main body of news 
reports). In other words, although I raised the possibility of speech presentation 
being used for discourse-domain summarizing purposes I did not really follow 
the idea through, something which I am beginning to do in this paper. If these 
examples are indeed DS discourse-domain speech summary, as I now believe, 
then the standard speech presentation faithfulness considerations do not apply, 
the only faithfulness constraint being that the wordings, whatever their style, 
represent a reasonable summary of what was said overall. Of course the 
standard proposition-domain presentation interpretation is still possible, leading 
to a possible reading ambiguity. Whether readers respond to the above 
headlines and equivalents as discourse-domain summaries or the presentation 
of particular propositions is an empirical issue, of course, which could be tested 
in future research. 
3.3. Narrator’s Presentation of Speech Act (NPSA) discourse-domain summary  
It is clear in the next, fiction, example that an NPSA discourse-domain 
summary interpretation of a part of the conversation makes most sense:  
. . . one of these questions related to our manner of living, and the place where, 
because I had heard he had a great plantation in Virginia, and that he had talked of going 
to live there, and that he had talked of going to live there, 
and I told him I did not care to be transported.  
 (Daniel Defoe 1906, The Fortunes and Misfortunes of the Famous Moll Flanders, 41) 
There is only one clause (no ‘reporting clause + reported clause 
structure’), the speech act (question) is specified and the presented string 
indicates that two topics were asked about, suggesting that more than one 
clause (and maybe even more than one turn) was uttered. 
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3.4. Free Indirect Speech (FIS) discourse-domain summary  
In the extract below, a group of characters are discussing preparations for 
an expedition they intend to undertake: 
And thus it was agreed. They would depart in the spring, to avoid the malarial menace of 
the later seasons. Each would require a portable bedstead, an air mattress and a pillow; 
they would take some Oxley's essence of ginger, some good opium, quinine and 
powders; a portable inkstand, a match-box and supply of German tinder; umbrellas 
against the sun and flannel belts to ward off cramps of the stomach during the night. 
    (Julian Barnes 1989, A History of the World in 10½ Chapters, p. 149) 
Arguably all of this extract is discourse-domain speech summary. The 
first sentence is NPSA. For a group of people all to agree, there must normally 
be more than one utterance of agreement, so the NPSA must be the summary of 
a number of contributions. The NPSA summary introduces a stretch of FIS, 
which again appears to be discourse-domain summary, this time of an extended 
stretch of interaction. The first of the two FIS sentences has a plural subject, 
again suggesting more than one speaker and so more than one conversational 
turn. This in turn suggests that the subsequent sentence, which is in effect a 
long list of the items that the group would need to take, is also a summary of an 
extended interaction among the participants about what they would need, 
probably with different individuals suggesting different items. 
3.5. Narrator’s Presentation of Voice (NPV) discourse-domain summary  
Breathless, half-choking, she told the dreadful story.     
(Katherine Mansfield, ‘The Garden Party)12 
I have classified this example as NPV, not NPSA, discourse-domain 
summary because the telling of a story (in this case Laura’s description of her 
encounter with the family of a working-class man who has just been killed in 
an accident) is unlikely to involve just one proposition and we cannot know 
what specific speech acts were used in the telling of the story. It would be even 
more clearly discourse-domain summary if Mansfield had added the topic of 
the story (e.g. ‘. . . she told the dreadful story of the dead man’). The above 
sentence could conceivably be NPSA summary if we assume that all of the 
sentences uttered were statements. This provides support for the theoretical 
likelihood that there can be inter-category ambiguities on the discourse-domain 
speech and writing summary scales as well as on the ‘standard’ discourse 
presentation scales. 
                                                     
12  I am grateful to Chang Shuchen for pointing out this example to me. 
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In Leech and Short (2007 [1981]: 10.1.3) I suggested that ‘Mr D’Arcy 
came from the pantry, fully swathed and buttoned, and in a repentant voice told 
them the history of his cold. Everyone gave him advice . . .’ was what I am 
now referring to as NPSA. A more accurate account, given the above, is that 
‘Mr D’Arcy . . . told them the history of his cold’ is ambiguous between NPSA 
proposition-domain summary presentation and NPV discourse-domain summary 
presentation, and that ‘Everyone gave him advice’ is NPSA discourse-domain 
summary presentation. 
4. Speech and writing discourse-domain summary presentation scales  
Given that I have now provided examples of speech presentation 
discourse-domain summary using each of the standard speech presentation 
categories, and that it is likely that examples can be found of each of the 
categories throughout writing summary too, I would like to propose a 
discourse-domain speech summary presentation scale and a discourse-domain 
writing summary presentation scale, to match the standard proposition-domain 
speech and writing presentation scales (where the subscript ‘s’ below indicates 
a discourse-domain summary interpretation): 
            Discourse-domain summary speech presentation  
[N] [NPS] NPVs NPSAs ISs FISs DSs 
Discourse-domain summary writing presentation  
[N] [NPW] NPWs NPWAs  IWs FIWs DWs 
Figure 2. Discourse-domain summary speech and writing presentation scales 
 
The introduction of a set of discourse-domain summary presentation 
scales would allow us to be more accurate in our interpretative and analytical 
claims for the stretches of presented discourse under discussion. They would 
also enable us to describe more exactly the ambiguities and uncertainties that 
can occur between proposition-domain presentation and discourse-domain 
summary presentation. The NPSA/NPSAs and NPWA/NPWAs category pairs 
are quite likely to be ambiguous with one another, as the NPSA and NPWA 
presentational categories are prototypically associated with summary on both 
the proposition-domain and the discourse-domain scales. 
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5. Proposition presentation functioning as discourse-domain summary 
presentation  
We have already seen in 3.4 that it is possible to have ambiguities both 
between (a) proposition-domain presentation categories which are adjacent on 
the cline and (b) proposition-domain presentation and discourse-domain 
summary presentation, at least in cases where the speech is presented relatively 
minimally. This, in turn, raises the possibility of similar sorts of ambiguities in 
relation to adjacent categories. 
What I have also come across, however, are some examples of presentations 
which effectively constitute (i) proposition-domain presentation and (ii) discourse-
domain summary presentation at the same time. Consider the example below (I 
have numbered the sentences for ease of reference), which comes at the 
beginning of the garden party referred to in the title of the story, with Laura 
welcoming the guests as they arrive: 
    ‘Darling Laura, how well you look!’ (1)  
     ‘What a becoming hat, child!’ (2)  
 ‘Laura, you look quite Spanish. (3) I’ve never seen you look so striking.’ (4)  
And Laura, glowing, answered softly, ‘Have you had tea? (5) Won’t you have an ice? (6) 
The passion-fruit ices really are rather special.’ (7)  
 (Katherine Mansfield, ‘The Garden Party’)13 
(1), (2) and (3)–(4), because they are each contained within separate sets 
of inverted commas look like conversational openers produced by different 
people commenting on Laura’s appearance, They would thus seem to be DS 
proposition-domain presentations of the individual utterances of three different 
characters arriving at the party, with no matching individual response turns 
from Laura being provided. The DS of sentences (5)–(7), on the other hand, as 
they cohere together pragmatically and are all contained within one set of 
inverted commas, are apparently14 all excerpted from one of Laura’s responses 
to one of the visitors. Hence each DS example in (1)-(4), seen on its own, is 
traditional proposition-domain speech presentation. But they are clearly also 
representative parts of three separate interactions and, together, the three 
sentences of Laura’s presented speech also count, by inference, as the enaction 
the sort of response Laura would have made to all of her guests, including the 
three who produce sentences (1)-(4). So, overall we have what amounts to a 
quotative summary, which quotes representative parts of at least three 
                                                     
13
  Also supplied to me by Chang Shuchen. 
14 
 The story is a fiction, of course. 
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conversational openings and one (part of) a representative reply, with the rest 
of the discourse omitted. In other words, the DS proposition-domain speech 
presentation is being used at the same time as (DS) discourse-domain summary 
presentation.  
This discussion in turn brings me to another example I now realize I did 
not get quite right in Style in Fiction: 
Mr Shepherd hastened to assure him, that Admiral Croft was a very hale, hearty, well-
looking man, a little weather-beaten to be sure, but not much; and quite the gentleman in 
all his notions and behaviour; ― not likely to make the smallest difficulty about terms; 
― only wanted a comfortable home, and to get into it as soon as possible; ― knew he 
must pay for his convenience; ― knew what rent a ready-furnished house of that 
consequence might fetch; ― should not have been surprised if Sir Walter had asked 
more; ― had enquired about the manor; ― would be glad of the deputation, certainly, 
but made no great point of it; ― said he sometimes took out a gun, but never killed; ― 
quite the gentleman. 
(Jane Austen, Persuasion Ch. 3, quoted in Leech and Short 2007 1981]: 10.1.4) 
I described this extract, correctly, I think, as FIS. But in the light of the 
DS example from the Katherine Mansfield sentence above, I think it is more 
accurately described as FIS quotative summary, as the dashes and elliptical 
syntax clearly suggest that we are being presented with excerpted snippets of a 
longer speech (and maybe even of a series of Mr Shepherd’s turns, with the 
contributions of Sir Walter and others omitted). The introduction of the kind of 
careful proposition-domain presentation and discourse-domain summary 
presentation analysis I have been arguing for in this paper thus helps us to 
characterize better the detailed effects of such examples. A similar Jane Austen 
example (which is also arguably ambiguous between FIS and FDS) is 
discussed in Pallarés-García (2008: 63), who refers to it as ‘an interesting 
mixture of quotation and summary’.15  
These examples are similar to what Fludernik (1993: 411) calls 
contraction, for which she provides a DS example, derived from Page (1988 
[1973]: 32) and indeed my notion of summary shares some similarity with what 
she calls ‘condensed speech acts, again giving DS examples to illustrate what 
she means. 
6. Concluding remarks 
This paper clearly builds on the work of others (e.g. Sternberg, Page, 
Tannen, Clark and Gerrig, and Fludernik) as well as my own, including some 
                                                     
15
  I would like to thank Elena Pallarés-García for pointing out this example and sharing her dissertation 
with  me. 
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of my own earlier imprecisions. Analytical false steps are, of course, an 
inevitable, and indeed welcome, consequence of stylisticians’ attempts to be 
empirical and analytically and interpretatively precise. I would be pleased, of 
course, for others to help fill in the blanks I have referred to above and correct 
any mistakes, inaccuracies or gaps. Similarly, I am very interested in hearing 
from others about different kinds of discourse presentation ambiguities and 
uncertainties they have discovered. I would also like to suggest that empirical 
work is conducted on whether or not real readers arrived, while reading, at the 
kinds of discourse-domain summary interpretations I have suggested.  
Finally, I would suggest that discourse presentation analysts need also to 
spend some concentrated time on investigating the pragmatic processes 
involved in inferring whether a presentation is what I have called proposition-
domain presentation or discourse-domain summary presentation (or both at the 
same time). As I have suggested in some of the discussion of individual 
examples above, the co-text may contain information to suggest that a 
discourse-domain summary is involved, the presentation itself may have 
relevant summary-suggestion features and we clearly use schematic knowledge 
of various kinds to infer that the presentation of what Ryan calls the Textual 
Actual World is summarized. How we perceive and respond to discourse 
presentation ambiguities and vaguenesses, both within and across the 
presentation scales, also merits inferential pragmatic investigation. Indeed, 
given that, to date, the definition of the discourse presentation categories has 
been dominated by structural considerations (e.g. syntax, lexis), it is arguable 
that the elephant in the room in discourse presentation theory and analysis is 
the relative weighting of formal, contextual and pragmatic factors when 
deciding upon categorizations, discourse-presentation types (e.g. proposition-
domain presentation and discourse-domain summary presentation) and the 
effects associated with them. 
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